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Introduction
Over the last decade a great deal of research has been devoted to analyzing the economic determinants of attitudes toward immigration. Special attention has been paid to testing the hypothesis that competition with immigrants in the labor market influences native workers'
views.
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The degree of competition between native and immigrant workers is defined by their relative skills. In most studies skills are measured using education levels. Under the assumption that immigrants are, on average, less educated than natives, it is expected that low-educated natives oppose immigration to avoid depressing their wages. In contrast, being less exposed to competition from immigrants, highly-educated natives should hold less negative views toward (low-educated) immigration and could even be in favor of it, depending on the elasticity of the supply of capital. Typically, most studies have found a positive association between respondents' educational attainment and their pro-immigration views. This association has been interpreted as evidence that labor-market competition has indeed attitudinal effects.
We find such interpretation wanting for the following two reasons. First, it must be noted that the observed relationship between education and attitudes toward immigration does not constitute by itself unequivocal evidence in favor of the labor market exposure hypothesis since mechanisms other than competition could be driving this association. Sociologists and political scientists have long been putting forward alternative interpretations of the attitudinal effects of education (see e.g. Jackman and Muha 1981 , Bobo and Licari 1989 , Burns and Gimpel 2000 , Kingston et al. 2003 . They have argued that the positive effect of education on pro-immigration attitudes could be entirely due to values and predispositions that are associated to schooling, such as tolerance, open-mindedness or political correctness, rather than to relative scarcity of human capital (see also Wagner and Zick 1995; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007, Côté and Erickson 2009 ).
1 Mayda (2006) provides a useful brief overview of the relevant literature.
3 immigrants' competition and hence will be more (less) likely to display pro-immigration attitudes.
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By estimating directly the attitudinal effects of respondents' general, job-specific and communicational skills, we attempt to cover all the skill dimensions of labor-market competition. To our knowledge, ours is the first paper that provides such a comprehensive test for the exposure hypothesis.
Another attractive feature of our analysis is the use of individual-level data for many countries, as in Mayda (2006) . Our main data source is the 2004 European Social Survey.
The immigration module in this dataset has several unique features. It contains detailed questions that are highly relevant to understanding individual opinions on immigration. In addition, identical questions are posed to all countries included in the survey, allowing for high quality cross-country comparisons. 4 For our purposes, another attractive feature of the data is that it identifies the respondents' region of residence within the country. Following Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003) and Peri and Sparber (2009) , we also use the US Occupational Network Online Dataset (O*NET) to build measures of the intensity of interactive (and manual) tasks by occupation.
Methodologically, we estimate an econometric model that allows for heterogeneity at the individual, regional, and country level. The dependent variable is a measure of the respondent's views toward immigration and we consider three dimensions of skills that determine these views: formal education, required job-learning time at the current job net of education (that is, job-specific human capital) and communication-intensity of the current occupation. Each of these skill variables measures a distinct source of protection from immigrant competition in the labor market. We expect lower exposure in each dimension to be associated with more favorable immigration attitudes.
2 Supply constraints or job searching costs may limit the number of native workers that can shift from manual to communication-intensive occupations.
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A further contribution of our study is our treatment of individual heterogeneity. Our analysis explicitly accounts for heterogeneity among natives in their views toward immigration and for potential self-selection into low-immigration jobs. Individual observable heterogeneity is addressed by estimating specifications that include a vector of controls for ideological and attitudinal variation, whilst self-selection is addressed by using an instrumental-variables approach. Specifically, we use the regional availability of lowexposure jobs as an instrument for actual individual exposure in the current job. To our knowledge, building an instrument for individual labor market exposure is novel in the literature.
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Overall, our results suggest a larger role for labor market competition as a determinant of individual attitudes toward immigration than previously found, as well as a new interpretation for the positive association between education and pro-immigration attitudes.
More specifically, we report the following three main findings.
First, the limited role for labor market competition in earlier studies may have been due to a combination of poor skill indicators and endogeneity problems. Our estimates suggest that individuals with above-average dislike for immigrants tend to work in low-immigration jobs, biasing OLS estimates downwardly.
Second, our instrumental-variables estimates show that individuals employed in less exposed jobs are relatively more pro-immigration. This is true for our two new measures of exposure. Both the amount of specific human capital required by the job as well as the type of skills required in any given occupation play a crucial role in shaping attitudes toward immigration. This finding provides indirect evidence in support of the mechanism in Peri and Sparber (2009). Namely, it is consistent with the prediction that unskilled natives will 5 Endogeneity concerns of the type addressed here are also at the heart of the analysis of Dustmann and Preston (2001) . They are interested in the effects of ethnic geographical concentration at the local level on individual attitudes toward immigration. To that effect they build an instrument for local ethnic concentration using regional data.
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5 shift away from jobs and occupations where they face greater competition from immigrant workers.
Third, the positive effect of formal education on pro-immigration attitudes is orthogonal to job-specific human capital but it is greatly reduced when we control for the level of communication-intensive (manual) tasks in the current occupation. This suggests that, to some extent, education is a proxy for the type of occupation.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 situates this paper in the context of the previous literature. Section 3 presents the data sources, definitions of variables and descriptive statistics. Section 4 introduces our estimation method and explains how we deal with endogeneity. The main findings are presented in Section 5. Sensitivity analyses are reported in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
Previous literature
Our paper is part of a large and growing body of literature analyzing the determinants of attitudes toward immigration. We can classify the work that is more directly related to our analysis in three main groups. Britain. To identify the role of labor market concerns they employ survey questions on fear of job loss, ease of finding a job, and expected future earnings. The results are similar in both cases. They find that subjective labor market concerns are a significant determinant of attitudes toward immigration. However, fiscal considerations and cultural and racial concerns seem to play a larger role. We note that their labor market variables are not directly related to exposure to competition from immigrants.
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6 Our paper is also related to a large empirical literature examining the relationship between individual education levels and attitudes toward immigration. The common finding across all papers listed below is that more educated individuals are more pro-immigration, a finding that is typically interpreted as evidence in favor of the labor-market competition hypothesis. Among the early studies, Espenshade and Hempstead (1996) and Scheve and Slaughter (2001) use data for the US, while Dustmann and Preston (2001, 2005) Interestingly, the correlation with education is positive but very low (0.13). This suggests that the wording of the question may indeed allow us to disentangle the effect of education from the effect of job-specific human capital on immigration views.
We also use a second set of variables to measure workers' degree of protection to labor market competition from immigrants. In the robustness section we will also use the index of manual skills. Note that, implicitly, we are assuming that the skill requirements in US occupations are the same as the skill requirements in the same occupations in Europe. While it would certainly be a stretch to make this assumption for all the occupational descriptors included in O*NET or if we were comparing countries with widely different levels of economic development, we believe it is a reasonable assumption in the context of our analysis.
Descriptive statistics
Let us now provide a brief description of the main variables in our analysis. We start with the dependent variable: a measure of the respondent's desired level of immigration of people of the same ethnicity as most of the population in the country (IM1). Appendix 2 contains the exact wording of the question. Appendix 3 reports some summary statistics.
The modal score is 75, with 46% of the sample, and a total of 68% supporting some more or many more immigrants of the same ethnicity. As for the rest of the sample, 25% think that only a few more immigrants should be admitted and about 7% of the population think no more immigrants should be allowed into their countries. The mean response across all countries (score 70.9) is very close to "allow some more immigrants." However, it is 9 The authors are most grateful to Sara De La Rica and Catalina Amuedo Dorantes for kindly making their crosswalk available to us. 10 The main reason for the increase in correlation is that the O*NET-ESS crosswalk only allows us to match 3-digit O*NET occupational codes into 2-digit ISCO-88 occupations.
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11 interesting to note that there is substantial variation across countries. Table 1a Table 1a reports attitudes toward immigration that are ethnically different to the majority of the population in the destination country.
Clearly, pro-immigration attitudes are lower (average score 65) than for the case of immigrants with the same ethnicity as the majority of the population (average score 71).
However, we note that the values in column 2 are approximately increasing as we move down the table, suggesting that the ranking of countries is practically the same for the two measures of attitudes toward immigration. We shall use this variable in our robustness section.
Let us now turn to the main explanatory variables. To relate to earlier literature it is helpful to begin by reviewing the data on years of education. As shown in column 3, the mean across all countries is 12.7 years, but the data display a larger variation, ranging from 8.7
(Turkey) to 14.4 (Denmark) years of education. Again we note that the values in column 3
are generally increasing as we move down the list, even though the relationship is not very strong. This illustrates that the positive association between pro-immigration attitudes and years of schooling is not only found across individuals within a country but also across countries.
Next, let us examine our measure of job-specific human capital. The mean value across all countries for how much time is needed for someone with the right qualifications to replace a worker is 8.9 months (Table 1a) . Again we observe substantial cross-country variation, ranging from 3.9 (Portugal) to 13.2 months (France), as illustrated by Table 1a . As we noted earlier, our measure of job-specific human capital is only weakly correlated with years of education. The correlation coefficient is 0.13. (Poland). We also note that the top of the ranking by communication skills coincides with the bottom by manual skills, and vice versa. As we discuss later, the correlation coefficient between these two variables is very close to minus one. 
where the right-hand side contains country-specific intercepts, our new measures of exposure (job-specific human capital and communication skill requirements in the current occupation), years of education, and a set of controls. 11 The vector of controls always includes, age, age squared, gender, and dummies for the presence of children in the household, living in a rural area, and having a foreign-born mother. Occasionally, we will also introduce a set of additional variables aimed at capturing individual heterogeneity that may be relevant to understand the respondent's views on immigration (ideology, religiosity, happiness, trust, and social capital). 12 For short we shall refer to this latter set of variables as individual attitudes. Finally, we allow the error term to be correlated across individuals living in the same region.
11 In principle it would be possible to include region-specific intercepts. We shall do so in one of our OLS specifications. However, given the definition of our instrument, only country-specific intercepts can be included in our instrumental-variables specifications. 12 We are aware that some of these attitudinal variables may be endogenous. To evaluate this concern we will estimate all our main specifications with and without the vector of attitudes.
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As argued above, together with general skills, job-specific human capital and communicational skills should provide protection against labor-market competition from immigrants. Hence we expect the coefficient on years of education (γ) and on our two additional measures of labor market protection to immigration (β 1 and β 2 ) to be positive.
Endogeneity
We are concerned with the following endogeneity problem. Individuals that particularly dislike immigration will search more intensively for jobs with few immigrants. These jobs will tend to display a high degree of protection from competition from immigrants. As a result, OLS estimates of our coefficients of interest (β 1 and β 2 ) are likely to be downwardly biased.
Our strategy to deal with this endogeneity problem is to use instrumental variables.
Specifically, we postulate that individuals living in a region where there is a high availability of highly protected jobs are more likely to end up in one of these jobs than a comparable individual in a region where protected jobs are scarce. Thus we propose to use a measure of the regional availability of protected jobs as an instrument for the degree of protection in an individual's job. In particular, we instrument an individual's level of job protection by the mean protection of the average worker in his or her region of residence.
Implicitly, our approach assumes that natives do not sort into regions (or countries) based on their views on immigration. 13 Similarly, and in line with the literature, we also assume that educational attainment is not determined by one's views over immigration.
Let us now examine the relevance of our instrument. Table 3 reports the results of the firststage regressions. We report several specifications, varying in the dependent variable. In column 1, the dependent variable is SHK, our measure of job-specific human capital. The right-hand side of the regression contains country-specific dummies, a series of controls (not shown in the Table) that include years of education, and the average value of SHK in 13 There is little evidence of displacement of natives in response to immigration in US data (Card and DiNardo 2000, Card 2001) or in European data (Gonzalez and Ortega, 2009 Finally, we perform a robustness test on the strength of our instruments. We drop all regions with fewer than 25 observations (less than 5% of the total sample of individuals).
The bottom panel of Table 3 shows that the first-stage estimates are virtually unchanged and the F-statistic associated to the null hypothesis of weak instruments remains very high.
Main results
Job-specific human capital
We are interested in testing the following hypothesis. Individuals employed in jobs characterized by high requirements of specific human capital hold more favorable views on immigration. This is because job-specific skills protect insider native workers from outside competition. To test this hypothesis we estimate the regression model described in equation
(1). The dependent variable is a measure of the respondent's pro-immigration views (IM1).
The right-hand side of the model contains country (or region) fixed effects, the degree of job-specific human capital in the worker's current job, years of education, and a number of controls. We cluster standard errors at the regional level. Table 4 presents the OLS (columns 1-4) and IV estimates (columns 5 and 6). As a benchmark, column 1 reports the OLS estimate of a regression where attitudes toward immigration are solely a function of years of education and individual controls. As expected, the education coefficient is positive and quite large (1.07). We also note the negative coefficients on the female, children, and rural dummies, and the large and positive effect of having a foreign-born mother. The following columns include the main explanatory variable, job-specific human capital. The OLS estimate is small and we cannot reject a value of zero (columns 2-3). Column 4 includes region fixed effects, which hardly affect the estimates obtained in column 3.
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Column 5 presents our preferred specification for the IV estimation. We find that individuals employed in jobs characterized by high job-specific human capital are more pro-immigration. The effect is quite large and statistically significant (p-value 0.053). An increase in four months in the time required to learn job-specific skills (conditional on education) has roughly the same effect on attitudes toward immigration as one additional year of education. In this sense, the marginal effect is three times larger for specific-human capital than for years of schooling. It is worth noting that the effect we have uncovered is distinct from the effect of educational attainment. The IV estimate of an additional year of education is 0.94, which is not statistically different from its OLS estimate. Finally, column 6 presents an additional IV specification including the vector of attitudinal variables. These additional controls reduce by roughly 10% the effect of education but do not affect our estimate of the effect of job-specific human capital.
We also note that our results suggest that OLS estimates of the effect of specific human capital were downwardly biased, as we had expected. Our interpretation is that individuals who dislike immigrants search more intensively for jobs that are highly protected from immigration. As a result individuals sort into jobs that, given their qualifications, require higher job-specific human capital. The endogeneity bias that we uncover is similar to the one documented by Dustmann and Preston (2001 To analyze this question we estimate the model in equation (1) Table 5 . Columns 1-4 report OLS estimates. Note that the estimate of years of education ranges between 0.61 and 0.74 after introducing our index of communication intensity. This is around 30% lower than in the previous section. In turn, the point estimate associated to communication skills is positive and significant, with values around 10.
Columns 5 and 6 present our IV estimates. As was the case for job-specific human capital ( have differentiated effects on immigration views. The point estimate of SHK is 0.22 and the associated standard error is 0.12 (that is, a p-value of 0.053). As argued in the previous section, the effect of job-specific human capital is roughly three times larger than that of education, when both are measured in the same time units. 14 Column 3 adds our measure of In conclusion, the two measures of protection toward immigration that we have analyzed (job-specific human capital and communication skills) are both found to have significant and distinct effects on individual attitudes toward immigration. Our results also suggest that the effect of education on attitudes operates mainly through occupational attainment, since formal education allows access to occupations that are protected from labor-market competition with immigrants. These occupations require high communicational skills.
Robustness
We now conduct some sensitivity analysis on our main results. Specifically, we make use of two alternative definitions of attitudes toward immigration, we re-estimate our main models on subsamples that differ in the level of education, and we experiment with substituting the measure of communication skills by the measure of manual skills. Table 7 reports our findings. To provide a benchmark for comparison, column 1 displays the estimates from specification 3 in Table 6 . Column 2 uses manual skills as a measure of comparative advantage with respect to immigrants. As noted previously, the education coefficient is drastically reduced when the regression includes either manual or communication skills. In contrast, the coefficient of job-specific skills remains largely unaltered.
Columns 3 and 4 use two alternative measures of the respondent's views toward immigration. Dependent variable IM2 is the simple average between the three questions available in the European Social Survey regarding the desired level of immigration. These questions differ on the geographic origin of the immigrants. 15 The point estimate on SHK falls a bit but remains significant at 10%. Column 4 uses IM3 as dependent variable. This variable is again an average of three questions on immigration. However, these questions differ from those used in IM1 and IM2 in one key aspect. The questions used in IM3 are much broader, and report on the respondents' views on the effects of immigration on their country's economy, culture, and life in general. 16 Note that this wider frame of reference could make responses to these questions less sensitive to individuals' degree of labormarket exposure. That is to say, a protected worker and an exposed one could very well agree on the effects of immigration on the economy as a whole or on the country's cultural landscape. However, attending to their economic self-interest, they may sharply disagree on what immigration policy to vote for. In this light it is not surprising that the estimates in column 4 show that specific human capital does not have a significant effect on IM3.
Instead years of education and manual skills appear to be significant. In order to better compare our results to those studies we report estimates of our main model on two subsamples. The first subsample (column 6) contains only individuals with less than 12 years of education (57% of the population). The second subsample (column 7)
includes only individuals with 12 or more years of education (43% of the total sample).
Remarkably, the point estimates that we obtain are very similar in both cases and, in turn, very similar to our main estimates (columns 1 and 2).
Overall, the results in this section show that that our main results are robust to the particular definition of comparative advantage used as well as to the heterogeneity in the effects of education.
Conclusions
This paper has re-examined the role of labor-market competition in the determination of Overall our results provide strong support for the exposure hypothesis: individuals employed in jobs that are less exposed to competition from immigrants are relatively more pro-immigration. In particular, we have three main results.
First, we build a new instrument for individual exposure to labor market competition and show that it is highly relevant. The instrument is based on the assumption that the types of jobs available in one's regional labor market affect workers' actual job characteristics in ways that are unrelated to individual attitudes towards immigration. Second, our instrumental-variables estimates show that being employed in a job requiring a large amount of specific human capital leads to relatively more pro-immigration attitudes. The marginal effect of job-specific human capital on attitudes is much larger than the effect of formal education. Third, we show that being employed in a communication-intensive occupation also leads to more positive attitudes toward immigration. This effect is different from the effect of job-specialization and can by itself explain away the association between formal education and attitudes toward immigration.
The latter finding provides indirect support for the endogenous job specialization theory postulated by Peri and Sparber (2009) . According to these authors, native workers respond to immigration by moving to occupations where they have a comparative advantage by virtue of being relatively better at communication-intensive tasks. Our results suggest that those native workers that manage to shift to the less exposed occupations display relatively more pro-immigration views than those that are unable to do so. In our view, supply-side constraints, such as the regional availability of low-exposure jobs play an important role in determining individual attitudes toward immigration. In conclusion, our findings suggest a larger role for labor-market competition as a determinant of attitudes toward immigration than previously found in the literature. The top 10 occupations according to average years of education, average job-specific human capital (job-learning time), average communicational intensity scores and average manual intensity scores.
Education (in years)
Mean Job-specific human capital (in months) Mean Notes:
-Standard errors clustered by region and robust to heteroskedasticity.
-*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1*** -All specifications include country-specific dummies, years of education, controls for gender, age, age squared, as well as dummies for children, rural, and foreign-born mother.
-The F statistic refers to the null of jointly zero coefficients.
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28 -Standard errors clustered by region and robust to heteroskedasticity.
-Standard errors in square brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1*** -Dependent variable is IM1, the answer to the question "Do you think there should be no more immigration, a few more immigrants, some more immigrants, or many more immigrants?" Question refers to immigrants belonging to the current majority group. -Standard errors clustered by region and robust to heteroskedasticity.
-Standard errors in square brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1*** -Dependent variable is IM1, the answer to the question "Do you think there should be no more immigration, a few more immigrants, some more immigrants, or many more immigrants?" Question refers to immigrants belonging to the current majority group.
-All specifications include country-specific fixed effects, dummies for children, rural, and foreignborn mother. Also controls for gender, age, and age squared.
-Measures of Attitudes: Ideology, Religiosity, Happiness, Trust, and social capital. -Standard errors clustered by region and robust to heteroskedasticity.
-All specifications include country-specific fixed effects, dummies for children, rural, and foreignborn mother. Also controls for gender, age, and age squared. Notes:
(1) Baseline. IV in our preferred specification. (6) Baseline on subsample of individuals with less than 12 years of education (57% sample).
(7) Baseline on subsample of individuals with more than 12 years of education (43% sample).
-All estimates in the table are IV. Standard errors clustered by region and robust to heteroskedasticity. Standard errors in square brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1*** -All specifications include country-specific fixed effects, dummies for children, rural, and foreignborn mother. Also controls for gender, age, and age squared. - 
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Our transformation: - 
Our transformation (in months): Moreover, crosswalks from the occupational coding system deployed by O*NET and ISCO-88 have so far only been available for a 3-digit into 2-digit conversion. ISCO-88 at 2-digits groups the 449 O*NET occupations into 26 broader occupational categories.
For the construction of our indices we proceed as follows: First, informed by factor analysis, we compute communicational intensity and manual intensity scores using the 3-digit O*NET dataset. This procedure, which is described in detail below, assigns both a communicational intensity and a manual intensity score to each of the 449 occupations of the O*NET dataset. Secondly, using the crosswalk kindly provided by Sara De la Rica and Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes, we convert our O*NET occupations into their ISCO-88 2-digit equivalents. All descriptors, as well as our two measures of communication and manual skill intensity are converted into 2-digits by averaging the scores of all 3-digit occupations belonging to the same 2-digit category. Finally, we match this information to the ESS data.
Our final skill measures are thus much less refined than it would be in principle possible, should we have a 3-to-3-digit converter (or even a 4-to-4). Information is undoubtedly loss in the matching process. For example, O*NET provides detailed skill descriptors for "Elevator installers and repairers", yet in order to match this US 3-digit occupation into the ESS, we need to average these skill descriptors with those of all other occupations belonging to the same ISCO-88 2-digit equivalent, which is "Metal, machinery and related trade workers". Loss of information is unavoidable giving our matching procedure.
The construction of the skill indices in O*NET was informed by exploratory factor analysis. Principal-component factor analysis with orthogonal varimax rotation identified 10 different factors out of the 277 skill descriptors in the O*NET dataset (at 3-digits). The first factor accounted for 25.6 of the variance. Skill-descriptors with rotated factor loadings higher than 0.6 in this first factor included both skills directly involved in communication Although we only focus on direct communicational skills, it must be noted that occupations were communicational skills are on demand tend to be those that also require abstract thinking.
The fourth factor of the principal component analysis identified 7 different skills/abilities relating to physical dexterity (i.e. visualization, arm-hand steadiness, manual dexterity, finger dexterity, control precision, wrist-finger speed and visual color discrimination).
These 7 skills correspond to the descriptors with rotated factor scores higher that 0.55. The manual dexterity factor accounted for 10.1 per cent of the skill variance. The manual intensity index is constructed by averaging the task-importance and observed ability scores of these 7 skills.
19 For each skill involved in any given occupation, O*NET experts evaluate 2 different dimensions: 1) how important is this given skill/ability for the occupation and 2) the average observed levels of such skill in the occupation. Both dimensions correlate very highly, as can be expected. Factor analysis and hence our indices use both type of descriptors so for each of the skills involved in our indices we actually average 2 different descriptors, one referring to task-importance and the other referring to observed levels. 
